Meet the MI Supreme Court candidates: Andrew Fink

In November, Michigan voters will choose two justices to serve on the state Supreme Court. Michigan Public's Morning Edition is featuring interviews with the four candidates. There are two candidates running for a partial four-year term. There are also two candidates running for a full eight-year seat on the court.

Andrew Fink is on the ballot. He’s currently a state representative who represents Michigan’s 35th District, which covers Hillsdale and Branch counties.

Fink spoke with Michigan Public Morning Edition host Doug Tribou.

Doug Tribou: I’ll start by noting that judicial candidates in Michigan are listed without any party affiliation on the ballot. However, parties do nominate candidates for the court and the Michigan Republican Party selected you as one its nominees.

You’re a graduate of the University of Michigan Law School. You served in the Marine Corps after that, then became an attorney in your family’s law firm, and later a state legislator. Why did you decide to run for the court now?

Andrew Fink: Well, you know, it's a job that not everybody can do in the sense that it requires, of course, not just a law degree and five years' experience as an attorney, but I think the general background that I have as an attorney is also an important aspect of what I think I can bring to the court here because the Supreme Court is the court that handles matters across the legal spectrum in our state.

As a state legislator, where any area of law might be the subject of the next bill that we look at, and as an attorney in very general practice, I think that I have a good understanding of how the law impacts the citizens in the tens of thousands of cases being litigated in our district, circuit, and probate courts every year.

DT: On your campaign website, you write: “Michigan’s judiciary should be governed by judges who will respect the rule of law and apply an unwavering originalist interpretation to every case.” Could you say a bit more about that philosophy and how you’d apply it?

AF: Yes, absolutely. And I think, unfortunately, the term "originalist" has been politicized in ways that it really shouldn't be. There are originalists across the political spectrum — or across the legal spectrum — because what it really means is just trying to find the meaning of the text as it was understood by the people who adopted it, and a recognition that if the law is no longer working the way that we think it should, that the political branches — the legislature and the governor working together — should address that rather than having courts try to come up with their own preferred policy outcomes.

DT: When new state constitutional amendments are approved by voters, in many cases, the practicalities of how the amendment will work often end up in cases that come before the courts. How would you apply your originalist approach to a new amendment — or a recent one like the amendment to enshrine abortion rights in the state constitution — when there’s a sense of some details still being worked out?

AF: Well, without commenting on, you know, how I would intend to resolve any particular case, given that that's the restriction that the judicial canons place on us as judicial candidates, I'd say one of the nice things about having a consistent judicial philosophy is that you don't really have to worry too much about when the text was adopted or what the subject matter is. The approach that the judge should take is the same. I mean, it might make it a more difficult task to understand the meaning of a text that is older. It might be more difficult to execute if it's an older law.

DT: You are opposed to abortion and have spoken and written about that. How would that viewpoint affect your approach to cases that might involve the state’s constitutional amendment protecting abortion rights?

AF: Yeah, my views on policy matters — of course, you could find many, many other policy matters that I've spoken on that could also become legal issues at the court. And as I was just saying before, it really isn't material to the approach of resolving cases that are brought to a court.

DT: On Jan. 6, 2021, you posted on your Facebook page, “All citizens have the constitutional right to petition the government for the redress of grievances, and these citizens have the right to know that all our elections are free and fair. Governor Whitmer and Secretary Benson, these are your constituents, too. Will you commit to helping make sure Michigan elections are beyond reproach?” You posted that with a photo of protestors at the Capitol in Lansing as the riot in Washington was just starting to unfold.

Election issues frequently end up in the court system. Do you believe in the integrity of Michigan’s elections? Because that would seem to be a key starting point for a justice reviewing an elections case.

AF: Well, I'm not sure what you mean by do I believe in the integrity of them. I mean, notice that all that's said in that post, and I don't know about the timing. Certainly the event in Lansing began in advance of any trouble in Washington, D.C. And I don't mean to quibble about it so much as just say -- I don't I don't think that the association of what I said there, there's any association between that and what was happening in Washington, D.C.

But the fundamental point that I'm concerned with is that when the people don't believe that they're being heard by the relevant actors in the government, then they will tend to feel disassociated from their government, sort of cease to believe that their government is representing them. And that's a very dangerous circumstance which I don't want to see happen.

But in terms of being a judge, Doug, again, I just don't think that the area of law is going to really change my approach to deciding any cases. So the merits of the case and the text of the law will dictate how the case ought to come out.

DT: But do you not think that a sitting representative publicly asking the governor and the secretary of state to commit to making sure elections are beyond reproach in and of itself calls into question the validity of those elections?

AF: I mean, I didn't call that into question. All I said was, well, all I am asking is that everybody involved in the administration of elections agree that demonstrating to the people that the elections are free and fair is important. And I don't think that that's a matter of any controversy.

DT: Is there a case that you have worked on as an attorney that exemplifies the kind of thinking or approach that you would bring to the Supreme Court?

AF: Well, I was local council on a case called Rafaeli, LLC v. Oakland County, which the Michigan Supreme Court decided in our favor 7-0 in 2020. The approach taken there, which was to try to help the court understand the meaning of the Takings Clause and the way in which it impacts what state governments or their political subdivisions do with regard to tax foreclosure sales, in that case. It was a nice exercise, I think, in explaining the original meaning and the tax structure and history of the constitutional provisions at play there.

DT: Well, and just for the audience's clarification, that was a case involving homes that were foreclosed on and counties were selling homes and keeping the difference from what they were owed. So, say you owed $1,000 in back taxes, and they sold it for $100,000. The counties in some cases were keeping the additional $99,000, even though they'd only been owed $1,000. What was your approach on that case?

AF: It was, again, to explain, you know, whether that practice comported to the text or not. I think one of the arguments on the other side was that, well, when the state or the county takes your real property, your house and sells it, that in and of itself the satisfaction of the tax that you owe. And so what the state does with the property afterwards is immaterial because it's it's either pay us the money or give us your house.

And we were able to demonstrate that that's not the right way to look at it, that the debt owed is the money debt. And that when the property was taken to satisfy the money debt, the additional money needed to be returned to the taxpayer under the proper reading of those constitutional provisions.

Editor's note: Quotes in this article have been edited for length and clarity. You can listen to the full interview near the top of this page.